CASE STUDY

Fraud is already inside your revenue numbers

Two live titles, audited from the analytics exports they already produced. Their own fraud rules fire on 797 accounts. One carried a flag in-game.

RETROSPECTIVE AUDIT · TWO LIVE TITLES · EXISTING EXPORTS, NO NEW TRACKING

Why this is a measurement problem

Fraudulent revenue sits inside reported bookings, and the accounts committing it sit inside the cohorts being modelled. Every forecast built on top inherits both.

What the exports contained

~8%
of one title's bookings were fraud-suspect

797 vs 1
caught by their rules, versus flagged in-game

- One payment receipt reused across five separate accounts
- 90 purchases from a single account within one hour
- A currency balance of a billion where the game's own ceiling is around twenty thousand, matching the maximum a common mod menu writes

Payment fraud appeared in one title and currency manipulation in the other. Separate problems, separate fixes.

The rules already existed

The studio had already written the detection logic, and it fires. Nothing downstream was acting on it.

Two limits on this result

Fraud-suspect is not confirmed loss. It means an account matches a known signature. Treat the figures as an upper bound on exposure. Confirming any individual case requires the studio's own payment records.

This flags, it does not block. The audit was retrospective, run across exports after the fact. Preventing a transaction before it clears is a different capability with different latency requirements.

Client identifying details removed. Figures are those cleared for external use; where a result is not statistically powered it is described as such rather than quoted. hello@ilara.ai